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I n June 2007, Nikolaus Bauer, the head of BMW’s 2,500-employee power train plant in Dingolfing, Lower Bavaria, 
was worrying about what looked like an 
inevitable decline in the productivity of an 
aging workforce in the years ahead. With 
two of his production managers, Peter 
Jürschick and Helmut Mauermann (a co-
author, with Bauer), he developed an inno-
vative, bottom- up approach for improving 
productivity that the company is now 
testing and refi ning in plants in the United 
States, Germany, and Austria. The goal is 
to incorporate it across BMW’s global man-
ufacturing organization.  
BMW’s problem was that the average age 
of the plant’s workers was expected to rise 
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from 39 to 47 by 2017. Because older work-
ers tend to call in sick for longer periods 
and in general must work harder to main-
tain their output, bearing the full brunt of 
the demographic shift would threaten the 
plant’s ability to execute BMW’s strategy 
of enhancing competitiveness through 
technological leadership and productivity 
improvements. 
BMW has not been the only company 
with this concern. Corporate leaders, poli-
ticians, and labor economists in most de-
veloped nations are worried about the 
consequences of demographic change in 
their labor markets, which increasingly con-
sist of older workers. In the United States, 
for instance, the population older than 65 
will grow from 12.5% in 2000 to 16.6% in 
2020 (the corresponding numbers for Ger-
many are 16.4% and 21.6%, and for Japan 
17.1% and 26.2%). This trend will prove ex-
pensive: Across the developed world, the 
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A Pilot Production Line
health care costs for a person over 65 are 
roughly three times the costs for someone 
between the ages of 30 and 50. 
Traditional approaches to the prob-
lem include firing older workers or forc-
ing them into early retirement. But this 
is not an option for companies like BMW, 
which earn their workforce’s commitment 
by being dependable employers, and it is 
certainly not an option for an entire na-
tion: Wave after wave of early retirements 
in the 1980s and 1990s increased the ratio 
of retired to working citizens, making the 
fi nancing of retirement more diffi  cult. An-
other approach is to move older workers 
into jobs that are less physically demand-
ing, but this is not an option if there are not 
enough young workers to take their places. 
Nor is it a solution at the national level, 
where such a move could be interpreted 
as discriminatory. To complicate BMW’s 
problem, the company was the largest 
employer in Lower Bavaria, so a decision 
to lay off  or reassign older workers would 
have political consequences. 
Let’s see how Bauer and his colleagues 
resolved this apparent dilemma.
The Line
To arrive at their solution, Jürschick and 
Mauermann chose one of the plant’s pro-
duction lines for a pilot project. The line’s 
foremen, Günther Stadler and Kurt Dick-
ert, staff ed it with a year-2017 mix of work-
ers—that is, workers with an average age 
of 47. (See the exhibit “A Pilot Production 
Line.”) Stadler and Dickert then worked 
with the people on the line, supported by 
senior managers and technical experts, to 
develop productivity-improving changes, 
such as managing health care, enhancing 
workers’ skills and the workplace environ-
ment, and instituting part-time policies 
and change management processes. The 
direct investment in the 2017 line proj-
ect was almost negligible, approximately 
€20,000. But the 70 changes increased 
productivity by 7% in one year, bringing 
the line on a par with lines in which work-
ers were, on average, younger. 
The line, which was centrally located 
in the plant, produced rear-axle gearboxes 
for medium-sized cars and was operated 
by 42 employees. This relatively small line 
was one of the most labor intensive in the 
factory. It had started in 2003 with a per-
shift volume of 440 gearboxes, which was 
slated to rise to 500 in 2008. 
There was strong initial resistance to the 
project, which was quickly nicknamed the 
“pensioners’ line.” The younger workers al-
ready on the line felt they would suff er from 
an infl ux of less productive people, while 
older workers elsewhere in the plant feared 
that they would become much less produc-
tive if they were taken out of their comfort 
zones and assigned to the pilot line. To 
many workers, the project seemed like yet 
another top-down initiative that left them 
with no choice but to adapt. Stadler and 
Dickert had concerns of their own—namely, 
that BMW would reduce work-speed rates 
and performance goals and downgrade IT 
systems in an effort to accommodate the 
perceived defi ciencies of older workers.
To head off opposition, Jürschick and 
Mauermann consulted the plant’s Work-
ers Council. This turned out to be not only 
smart politics but also a practical move for 
the project’s success. The council referred 
the project team to an earlier study on 
worker productivity at BMW that had iden-
tifi ed a basic framework for change along 
fi ve dimensions: health management, skills, 
the workplace environment, retirement 
policies, and change processes. The frame-
work was theoretical, but it gave the team 
ideas about the issues they’d need to ad-
dress to improve the productivity of older 
workers. It also enabled them to get a han-
dle on the productivity problem. The study 
had used a standard questionnaire, the 
Work Ability Index (WAI), which assesses 
and scores the fi t between a worker’s abil-
ity and the demands of specifi c jobs. The 
analysis of 100 worker–job combinations 
in the rear-axle department revealed that 
the average productivity score decreased 
with age, as expected, but the variation in-
creased: Some workers remained fully pro-
ductive, while others experienced a strong 
decline. Thanks to these fi ndings, Jürschick 
and Mauermann went into the project un-
derstanding that productivity declines are 
not as inevitable as aging.  
Stadler and Dickert, meanwhile, held 
many one-on-one conversations with 
workers, explaining that the pilot line 
would not be a soft assignment for part-
time preretirees; it would be subject to the 
same ambitious productivity and quality 
standards as other lines. They also ap-
pealed to the workers’ pride: “We need 
your experience and skills to pull this off , 
and it’s important for the future of this 
plant. Our jobs are at stake!”
In the end, the project team persuaded 
20 workers already on the line to stay and 
enlisted 22 more—with the promise that 
they could return to their old positions after 
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one year. In October 2007, both the line’s 
shifts were staffed with a mix of workers 
refl ecting the plant’s projected 2017 demo-
graphic composition. 
The Process
The project piggybacked on a company-
wide health awareness initiative. In No-
vember 2007, the company organized an 
information day—concerning personal nu-
trition and health management—in which 
more than 10,000 workers, out of the 
19,000 or so in all Dingolfing plants, par-
ticipated. As part of that, the project team 
organized a self-diagnosis that awarded 
positive points for habits such as regular 
exercise and negative points for smoking 
or being overweight. 
Stadler and Dickert then organized kick-
off  workshops for the project, during which 
they asked workers to describe their aches 
and pains and what they would change on 
the line. These workshops pushed work-
ers to take charge of their well-being and 
of the project. Every idea raised was taken 
seriously, so employees felt secure enough 
to brainstorm freely. The team encouraged 
workers to write their ideas on cards and 
pin them on a board. People appreciated 
this way of communicating. One employee 
commented, “The old forms of the continu-
ous improvement program required a lot of 
writing. Completing these forms killed me. 
I used to be a farmer. Writing things down 
is hard for me.” 
Every worker received a “budget” of 
five points to allocate among the ideas—
a simple process that yielded a prioritized 
action list for the project team. “None of 
the ideas came from the top,” Mauermann 
says. “The managers and foremen delib-
erately abandoned control: We refrained 
from evaluating, criticizing, or rejecting 
single ideas. The employees came up with 
their own ranking.” 
Management’s willingness to quickly 
implement ideas further increased buy-in 
among workers. One foreman commented, 
“Idea generation really took off when a 
workstation got a wooden floor. People 
from neighboring lines laughed at fi rst, but 
after only one day it became clear that it 
helped. At the end of the day, your knees 
were not aching. This showed us that the 
2017 project could make sense.” 
After this, the workers took charge, and 
the project team focused on executing their 
ideas. The team called in an ergonomist, a 
safety officer, and process engineers for 
support, but the workers did most of the 
work themselves—some of it on their own 
time. They became increasingly proud of 
their involvement in the process.
The Changes
Many of the ideas implemented in the 2017 
line were physical changes to the work-
place that would reduce wear and tear on 
workers’ bodies and thus the likelihood 
that workers would call in sick. The new 
wooden flooring together with weight-
adapted footwear, for example, reduced 
joint strain and exposure to static electric-
ity jolts. The line workers also installed spe-
cial chairs at several workstations, which 
allowed them to work sitting down or to 
relax for short periods during breaks. The 
first model they brought in was a barber-
shop chair. After trying it out, the workers, 
with the help of an engineer, improved the 
Workers on the 2017 production 
line made 70 changes to workplace 
equipment that reduced physical strain 
and the chances of error. The total 
cost was €40,000 and a few hours of 
maintenance time. Examples include: 
Wooden flooring
Cost <€5,000
Reduces knee strain and 
exposure to static electricity jolt 
Barbershop chairs
Cost <€1,000
Enable short breaks and alternating 
physical strain (workers can stand or sit)
Orthopedic footwear
Cost <€2,000
Reduces strain on feet 
Angled monitors
No Cost
Reduce eyestrain
Done in two hours maintenance time
Magnifying lenses
Cost <€1,000
Reduce eyestrain and minimize 
sorting errors
Adjustable worktables
No Cost 
Ease physical strain and facilitate 
personnel rotation during shifts
Done by maintenance within 
normal hours
Large-handled 
gripping tools
No Cost
Reduce strain on arms
Project with university students
Stackable transport 
containers
No Cost 
Ease physical strain and facilitate 
personnel rotation during shifts
Modifi cation of containers already 
developed for a new-product 
introduction 
Larger typeface on 
computer screens
No Cost 
Reduce eyestrain and 
minimize sorting errors
Done by maintenance personnel 
during normal hours
Manual hoisting cranes
Cost <€1,000
Reduce strain on back
Total cost of cranes shared with 
university to support a master’s thesis
2017 Ergonomics
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chair’s shape and composition, replacing 
its plastic cover, which caused sweating 
and chafi ng, with a leather one. New seats 
were then developed with a chair maker 
for a total cost of less than €1,000. 
Some of the measures addressed both 
ergonomic and quality concerns. Installing 
vertically adjustable tables meant that work-
stations could be adapted to each worker’s 
height, reducing back strain. It also facili-
tated job rotation during a shift because the 
tables could be quickly adjusted to suit in-
coming workers. Similarly, the installation 
of fl exible magnifying lenses helped work-
ers distinguish among small parts, reducing 
eyestrain and mistakes. All told, the line 
implemented 70 small changes in design 
and equipment that improved ergonomics 
at various workstations. (For examples of 
some of the changes, and their cost, see the 
exhibit “2017 Ergonomics.”)
Design and equipment changes were 
complemented by changes in work prac-
tices. The line introduced job rotation 
across workstations during a shift in order 
to balance the load on workers’ bodies. 
(See the exhibit “Ergonomically Optimal 
Job Rotation.”) There was some initial re-
sistance. One worker commented, “I was 
against it. You always think the person 
preceding you on the machine doesn’t do 
as good a job as you can. But we quickly 
saw that time passes faster, we see better 
how the people around us work, and we 
can help one another.”
In addition, a physiotherapist devel-
oped strength and stretching exercises, 
which he did with the workers every day 
for the first few weeks. This provoked 
some teasing from the other lines, so many 
on the 2017 line were reluctant to perform 
the exercises. The breakthrough came 
when Stadler recruited a volunteer from 
the group, who fetched his colleagues at 
the beginning of breaks and performed the 
exercises with them. 
The Results 
As noted above, the capital investment for 
the 2017 line project amounted to about 
€20,000, which included time spent by the 
ergonomist and physiotherapist as well as 
Bauer, Jürschick, and Mauermann. The 
wages covering attendance at workshops 
amounted to almost €20,000, bringing 
overall costs to around €40,000.
What did BMW get in return? The line 
achieved a 7% productivity improvement 
in one year, equaling the productivity of 
lines staff ed by younger workers. The line’s 
target output was increased to 500 units 
per shift in mid-2008 and to 530 units per 
shift in February 2009, in keeping with the 
plant’s ambitious goals. After the productiv-
ity increase, four workers were reassigned 
to other lines, but no one, including the ini-
tial skeptics, wanted to leave. The 10 defects 
per million quality target was achieved after 
three months. Current performance stands 
at zero defects. Absenteeism related to sick 
leave, maternity leave, preventive health 
care, and rehabilitation stood at 7% during 
2008— higher than elsewhere in the plant 
but typical for this mix of older workers. By 
June 2009, absenteeism had dropped to 2%, 
below the plant average. 
BMW now touts the 2017 line as a model 
of productivity and high quality in its inter-
nal communications. Follow-up projects 
were instituted in Leipzig (Germany) and 
Steyr (Austria), in the final car assembly 
plant on the other side of Dingolfi ng, and 
in the U.S. plant. As BMW has rolled out 
this approach, it has made sure to address 
the specifi c conditions of the workplaces 
involved while it transfers the worker-
led approach to identifying and applying 
changes. The precise numbers are confi-
dential, but these extended tests show re-
sults similar to those in Dingolfi ng.
THE 2017 line project is a remarkable case of 
distributed organizational problem solv-
ing. The plant’s top management raised 
the issue, the production managers ran 
an experiment, and the line workers cre-
ated the solutions. It’s an approach that 
will become a critical capability for global 
companies. Introducing and scaling envi-
ronmental technologies and penetrating 
new markets in Asia are challenges similar 
to the one Nikolaus Bauer faced: Manag-
ers can articulate the problem and choose 
from among solutions, but they are not 
necessarily a good source of solutions. For 
those to emerge, frontline employees need 
the freedom to experiment. As companies 
come to grips with the strategic challenges 
ahead, the brainpower of their workforce 
may be the most important diff erentiating 
factor. HBR Reprint R1003H
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As part of an eff ort to maintain the 
productivity of older workers on a 
BMW production line, management 
analyzed the degree of physical strain 
experienced at various workstations. 
A involved mild or moderate strain, 
B was the most physically demanding, 
and C was the least. It was decided 
that workers could stay at work-
station A for an entire shift but that 
they should rotate between B and C 
to reduce the possibility of injury. WORKSTATION C 
LEAST PHYSICALLY DEMANDING
MAXIMUM 6 HOURS PER SHIFT
Assembly lid of rear-axle 
diff erential
WORKSTATION A
MILD/MODERATE STRAIN 
MAXIMUM 6 HOURS PER SHIFT
Assembly of drive fl ange and 
pinion
Ergonomically 
Optimal Job Rotation
WORKSTATION B
MOST PHYSICALLY DEMANDING
MAXIMUM 3 HOURS PER SHIFT
Fitting workpiece carrier with 
casting housing and bearings
MILD/
MODERATE 
STRAIN
MOST 
PHYSICALLY 
DEMANDING
LEAST 
PHYSICALLY 
DEMANDING
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